Liability of Corporations for Torts by Gallagher, Lyman Hicok
Cornell Law Library
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection Historical Cornell Law School
1895
Liability of Corporations for Torts
Lyman Hicok Gallagher
Cornell Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/historical_theses
Part of the Corporation and Enterprise Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Historical Cornell Law School at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gallagher, Lyman Hicok, "Liability of Corporations for Torts" (1895). Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection. Paper 63.
OF CORPORATIONS FOR TORTS.











INT tODU CT I ON.
The privilee f'oi'tr.ly gt.c-ited corporatiuns of' com-
mitting injuries with irpunity iiad its ori-in only in t-.
inflexibility of the ancient 1,rucjsses -nd in the un-
willingness of the courts to apply writs of " personal
bearing to beings having a nomin-l existence (a).
This absence of any substantial reason for aunying the
liability l' corporations, coupleu with the fact of
their rapid growth anci the consequent importance which
these legal bodies were assumin6, allowed and compelled
the courts to overturn the distorted views of conserva-
tive ju0JLes G.nd to erect in their stead new principles
founded on public policy and naturcl justice.
Thus the responsibility did not arise from any pro-
cess of evolution. In a sense corporations hud always
stood on an equal footing with individuals, and the
principles which, altered their position toward those
with whom they dealt only remuved one of the many fet-
ters which have so often inturfered with the aaninistra-
tion of justice.
(a). Yarborough v. ?Lank of England 16 East b, Pollock
on Torts, p. 5.
Worded differently, the result was nut reac.,ud by
lifting corporations to the plane t1 cu> oc'uiy but sim-
ply uy providing a means of reri-diLl approach for part-
ies seeking redress.
The equit T of' the rule is too ap 1 arent to aaryit
of argumient. The responsibility imposed is Lut the ob-
tKe
vious consequei.:ce of corporate existence "nd exercise
of corporate rignIts: naturally, duties &rnd privileges
are inselarable ana survive or fall tobether. No court
in changing the rules of law desired to discriminate
against corporations. In an opinion advurse to the
interests of corporations "n American judue s-ys: *I an,
no enemy to corporations. On the contrary, 1 look upon
them as a proof,and in no small degree, the cause of the
e2
unparalIAed acvancenient of rnou(ern civilization. "(a).
Equality alone was sought; and now, with regard to the
law corporations come into being as do individuals, en-
dowed with rigrts b? tile State and placed under certain
restraints by the same powe2 r.
Davis, J, in N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., v. Schuyler,
34 N. Y. 30, says: The "proposition ----- is so clear up-
on principle, and so distinctly settlea by authu'ity,
(a) hlightown v. Thornton, 8 Ga., 486, 505.
that nothing but confusion can flow from its disc ssionl",
"It will ear no more than ?lairn enunciation." Again,
. Justice Field in -Paltimore and Potomac E. L. co.v.
Fifth -a,-. Church, 108 U. 3. 31", sa:?s: "The aoctrine
which was sometimes asserted, that an action will not lie
against a corporation for a tort, is exploued. 'iht bad
rule iu that resPect now alipliss to corporations as
to individuals."
These quotations serve to show houw deeply routed is the
principle they involve and tne ncompromising manner -n
which that principle is put by the judiciary of the coun
try.
A few jurisdictions have, however, denied the
doctrine. (a). But these cases setting forth the oi,-
posite view of the situation would pass unnoticed wer-e
it not for the fact that they present the r(eord of a
great mistake which succeeding judges on the same bench-
es have seen and gladly ructified. (b). In effect, this
petty show of defiance only 0 ave strength to the rule of
corporation which is so fundamental tiit in modern Eng-
lish and American jurisprudence it stands uncontradict-
ed.
(A) Orr v. Bank of U. S., 1 Ohio, 37.
(R) Atlantic & Great Western hy. Co., v. Dunn, 19 011io
St. 163.
CHAPTER I.
Th~e fact thLt a corporation cn exist atic can re-
main a Jactor in the cormaerci~l world only thruugi t,-ie
instrumentality of irndividcals necessarily leads the uis-
cussion of its liability for torts into tiie fielc of
the lw of master and servant.
ut the legal relation which the corporation is
thus forced to assume negatives an: attempt at ascer#
taining the presence of responsibility by drawin6 dis-
tinctions between the different classes into which em-
ployment is usually divided. An agent is given a certain
discretion in the performance of his duties while the
ordinary servant works mechanically, but, never-
theless, the difierence resolves itself simply into one
of degree. The liability of a corporation remains the
same whether its position be that of principal, employer
or master. (a).
The corporation thus made a principal from the mo-
ment of its creation, the power to appoint agents fol-
lows as a necessary incident and is usually implied
though sometimes conferred by lebislative enactment (b),
(a) Schou. Dom. Rel. Sec. 461; 1,eche on Aoeucy Sec. 2.
(L) Gen. Corp. Law of K,,. Y., Sec. 11, su). 4.
This authority is exercisuct in the same rfrirner as if
undertaken by a natural person (a). And, so, in the
absence of' statutury provisions to tie contrary, the
authority of a corporation's agents n .- d nut be Proved
by a writing, but may be presumed from the nature and
facts of the particular case (b). Implied authority
may raise an es~oppel as in one case :iere a corporation
allowed persons, working under the direction of' its em-
ploye, to pursue their labor under the impression that
they wer 'e working for the corporation (c). Authority
is also proved bi showing that the principal has received
the benefits of the transaction and has adopted .na ap-
propriated the work of the agent (d); provided tiL work
was intended to directly benefit the principal (e).
(a) Kelly v. Board of Public Wtrks, 7b Va. 263; New Eng.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 25 Ind. 53b; Randall v. Van
Vechten 19 John. 60; Maine Stage Cu.v. Longley, 14 Me.
444.
(b) Wrarren v. Ocean Ins. Co., 16 Me. 439.
(c) Gowen Marble Co. v. Tarrant, 73 Ill. 608.
(0d. Peterson v. Mayor &c. of Tew York.
R. R. I. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Wilcox of Ill. 417i
Kelley v. Newburyport Horse R. R., 141 LI/,ss. 490.
(e) Western Pub. House v. D. T. of' Rock 84 Iowa 101.
Where the agency is to be proved, somethinb more titn
the assertions of the ageft that tke relation exists,
must be shown (a). A revocation of' a.-thurity is effect-
ed by agreement (b), by dissolutiun of the corporation,
or, of course, by the death of the agent.
Generally speaking, any person may be the subject
of the execution of the ri;ht of appjointment. In one
case it is stated that, "any one except a lunatic, im-
becile or child of tender years nuay Le an agent for
another. " (c). Authority may ;e conferred upon a part-
nership, and in such a ccse the act of any partner is
the act of the firm (d). Corporations are, Also, al-
lowecd to carry on business for uthers and to act in
practically the same manner as if the work were being
performed by an individual (e). By legislation in
some states the relation has practically been given ar
unlimited scope (f) . And, indeea, the relation of
agent is slrrounaed by so few requirements that very of-
ten persons incapable of occupying the position of prin-
cipal are employed to act as agents (g).
(a) Hatch v. Squires, 11 Mich. 185.
(b) Rowe v. Rand. 111 Ind. 206.
(c) Lyon & Co. v. Kent, Payne & Co., 45 -,1a. 656.
(d) Deakin v. Underwood, 37 Minn. 98.
(e) McWilliams v. Detroit Central :iills Co., 31 IVich.
274.
(f) Cal. Code, Sec. 2296; Dak. Code, Sec. 1338.
(g) Weisbrod v. Chicago, &c. hk. Co.18 Wis. 3b;
After a 1. 1, ointrrient, huovever, duties may be ptirformud by
the agent which are so nearly in the line if hIls &i-lOy-
ment that gr-at care is necessary to determine whether
the corporation is, so far as that d ty is concerned,
the &,oent's principal. So where a 1 erson sent a box
by an express conipany in c.re of one of its officiaiz;,
it was held that the company wai not liable for tie
loss of' the box, the a,_ent Laving become tlie agent of
the sender and not of te corrinon cari .er (a). It is tiue
.-eneral rule tuiat an a~ent cannot Lct for both princi-
pals in a contract; but if both principals are aware
of t 1e fact and they contract with that knowledge, both
are bound (b). Agency may extend through one or more
persons, themselves -gents, provided the sub-agent is
practically in the employ of the original principal.
If the sub-a!gent is so connected with the principal, the
intermediate party becomes a mere legal conauit. Here
it may be stated that the question of liability for acts
of fellow-servants is now undisputed and so miy Le
excluded. Tie principal &s not responsible for inju-
ries suistained by a fellow-servant throagh the miscun-
duct of another, if' the principal has used care in se-
lecting 1is servants. (c).
(a) Fitzsinrnons v. The So. Ex. Co., 40 6a. 330.
(b) Robinson v. Jarvis, 25 ,o. App. 421.
(c) Colo. &c. R. R. v. 0,c:en, 3 Colo., 499.
Persons working for tLe sarrie master in the ,s;ame employ-
ment are fellow-serva nts.
With this general understanding of the termy, "agent"
as a basis, -e are to determine just wl.at persons work-
ing in furtherance or the interests of a copjoratiun are
in a position to render that body liable for their
tortious nacts. And, first, persons performing duties
indepenctent of any control or supervision of th&princi-
pal are to be nxcluided a;Lbein6 entirely without the lim-
its of the law of agency. Injuries occasioned by these
independent contractors, as they are c1l1ed, or by per-
sons in their employ, are not, as a rule, imputable to
the principal (a). Thuis in a New York case the plain-
tiff, an employe of one Dillon who was engaged by de-
fendant to transfer rails from vessels to cars by means
of defendant's derrick, brought suit to relover for in-
juries sustained by the falling of the derrick, but was
not allowed to recover on the ground that Dillon was a
contractor.(b). The proposition which guided the
court in rendering the decision was, that "if the person
who was the inediate cause of' the injury was a contract-
or, engaged in performing a contract to do a specific
(a) Bailey v. Troy & Boston R. R. Co., 57 vt. 252; Hass v.
Phila. &c. Steamship Co. 88 Pa. St. 2u9; City of St.
Paul v. Seitz. 3 Minn. 205;Eaton v. Eu. &c. Ry. Co. 59 1w520
(b) King v. N. Y. &c. R. R. Co., 66 N. Y. 186.
work, .....-, the relation of' master and servant is nut
created by the contract betweun the parties, and for the
contractor's neglige ce while perfurming the work, the
other party is not liable".
The rule has its exceptions anu, they must be care-
folly noted since they rre probably more frequently
called into application than is the rule itself. The
exceptions are embodied by some courts in t-1 e statement
that where the injury "is entirely the result of the
wrongful acts of tle contractor or his workmen, the ---
employer is not liable; but where the obstruction or
defect which occasioned the -njury results directly from
the acts which the contractor agreed and was authorized
to do, the person who employs the contractor and author-
izes him to do those acts is --- is liable to the injured
party (a)'. The statement is somewhat vague. Better
stated, if the performance of the work results in the
creation of a nuisance, or the work is unlawful or can-
not be carried on without inj ry to third parties, the
principal is liable. Where a drain was so negligently
constructed as to cause a nuisance by alluwing tide Wa-
ters to flow into cellars of aajoining property holders,
the principal was held liable (b)
(a) Water Co. v. Ware, lu vall. 506; Gorman v. Gross,
125 Mass. 232.
The employment by contractors of nlawf-l means for
collecting a debt was held to render the irincipal lia-
ble to the injured party (A). The failure to perform
duties imposed by l-w makes the person commanued amen-
able for all injury r ,sulting from the negligence, as
ouritt ec
where, in violation uf an ordinance, aefendantlto place
lights about an obstruction in a street and plaintiff
was injured, defendant was held liaile (c). Municipal
corporations are bound to keep their streets in a safe
condition for the use of t.ie public in traveling and are
liable for any injuries caused through the improper per-
formance of this duty (d).
As is easily seen, a corporation is bound by the
acts of persons only when those persons because of ex-
press or implied authority are held out to the world as
the representatives of the corporation for certqin pur-
poses. Hence, as, "a corporation should have a full
and complete organiz\,ation and existence as an entity
before it can enter into any kind of a contract or tran-
sact any business", no one can before such orjanization
(b) p. 9. Sturges v. Theological Ed. Society, 130 Miass
414; Cuff v. Newark &c. R. h. -o., 35 N. J. L. 17; Scam.
mon v. City of Chicao, 25 111. 3L1.
(a) Casswell v. Cross, 120 iss 545.
(c) Wilson & Bro. v. White, 71 Ga. 50u.
(d) Storrs v. City of Utica, 17 .. Y. 104.
rendov a corporation liable to 1i..rties witil ';io he
deals or conies ii contact (a). To huld a corpoiration
responsible for any tlin6 which uccu ud before its inco'-
poration would be & iriere absurdity. Purents might ;s
well be allowed to make contracts binding on an unborn
child. Not un\'til the time of its birth does a cor-
poration "acquire its faculties to transact its busi-
ness and 1)erform its fuctions' . A different rule
would produce inaalti.able harm to persons contempllat-
ing the pursuit of business through incorporated bodies
and would also make the public suspicious and doubtful
whenever approached by promotef-s or other persons scek-
ing to obtain support for tlie corporation. With a vie w
to the law%, of tort, persons would cease to fum corpo-
rations preJ'ey-ring to trans~ct bosiiess on a nore limited
scale than take the chance of becoming liable for the
innimirerable injuries which agents in working for the
corporation might commit. An interesting case on this
point is Ferry v. ". F. & N. P. R. h. Co., 50 Cal. 435.
There defendant was sued for trespass and injury to cer-
tain real estate owned by plaintiff. Defendant set up
that al the time t :e tresi ass wis conmnittci it (defendarn4
wt, s unicoi±porated.
(a) Marchland v. Loan & Pledge Assn., 26 La. Ann. 389;
Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen 152.
The court in deciding the case said: "For any trespass
conaitted prior to the incorporation of the aefendant,
the inaividuals committing or airecting s--ch tre -pass
would be responsible in d L i;ge, but defendant cannot be
made to respond for an injury done before it had an
existenbe".
A corporation is incorporated usually by compliance with
the terms of the statutes proviaing for the formation
of corporations. In New York, certificates of incorpora-
tion are presumtive evidence of legal existence (a). 0t-
ten, the filing of a certificate is not a prerequisite
to corporate existence but is simply evidence of it (b).
And so a bona fide effort to form a corporation is gen-
erally sufficient if the intent be followed by an assump-
tion of corporate functions.
Acts committed after dissolution are obviously unim-
putable to a once-existent corporation. The reason
for the rule is that which rtlieves corporations from
liability for the acts of promoters: viz., that the re-
lation of principal and agent does not exist because the
necessary parties are not present. The case is even
stronger than that of acts done before incorporation
(a) ';ew York q en. Corp. Law, Sec. 9.
Ib) Vanneman v. Young, 20 A. (N. J.) 53.
as in the latter case afjlrmance of' an act may be made
while a dissolved corporation could never 1hve sich a
right. When dissolved no vestige of former existence
remains. So actions agairnEt a corporation after it has
ceased to live are void (a). But the dissolution does
not effect rights existing at the time of dissolution.
The assets of a corporation [-ecome a trAst fund for the
benefit of all creditors. A corporation may h-e diss-olved
by the act of the le islature in repealing its
charter or by the natural expiration of the time for
which the charter was granted. In some states enabling
statutes exist by compliance with which the corporation
may at any time dissolve itself.
In the cases above presented it will be noticed
that the relation of principal and a6ent did not exist
and the corporation was permitted to protect itself by
showing that fact. .e now come to the uiscussion of
those cases where the corporation seeks to defend it -
self from liability for the tortious acts of ,ersons
whom it admits are in its employ. Because of' the abo-
lition to a large extent of tihe doctrine of Ultra Vires
(ai National Bank v. Oolby, 21 Wall. 614i Greeley v.
Smith, 3 Story 658.
which confined the duties and privile;es uf a corpora-
tion strictly to tie ,rovi,;ions of the charter creating
it, numerous opportunities for ueciding q-estions of this
nature in the courts haveoeen oifered. And the re-
s7Jit has been, as before stated, to render a corporation
liable for tha wrongs perpetrated by its agents; but the
reform did nut reachi beyond its proper bounds. There
is line, therefore, beyond which even the most liberal
judges dare not go. Hence, when an agent attempts to
do any thing which is not in accordance with the intent
bf the corporation's charter and wholly without the cor-
porate powers and the limits of the business it was in-
tended to pursue, the responsibility for the act remains
solely in the agent. This rule precludes directors who
ate mere agents from launching the copporation with which
they are connected into difficulty by Ultra vires acts.
So it is said that a corporation co~ld not be held lia-
ble for assault and battery, if, in obedience to the de-
mands of the directors, an agent should attack and beat
a certain person; for the act was not one connected with
the transaction of the business for which the company
was incorporated (a).
(a) Brokaw v. N. J. R. & Trans. Co., 62 N. J. L. 328.
But no case definitely points out and 1'orri the nature
of the thing no .ourt will ever be able tupo±rnt out just
where the dividing line is situated. Ti~u q.,estion is
one of construction fur the judus in eacii particL .lar
case as it arises, and so the grouna already gained is
as likely to be lost by dif'ferrnces of opinion as it is
likely To be more sharply deflined. Probaly the oruaest
enunciation of the doctrine of Ulti'a vrires is that of
Marshall, Ch. J., in 2 (,ranch, 16'i, where he says:
"Withouat ascril-ing tu this body (an insurance compny)
which in its corporate capacity is the mere creature
of the Act to which it owes its existence, all the qual-
ities and disabilities annexed by the common law to an-
cient institutions of this sort, it may te correctly
sid to be precisely what the incorporating act has
made it, to dervie all its powers from that Act, and to be
capable of exerting its faculties only in the manner in
which that act authurizes". This statement is with-
out doubt too conservative and could hardly s-uffice to
cover some cases which have carried the (octrine of irn-
plied powers to an almost unlimited extent. Yet ordinar-
ily any court would keep within the bounds of the rule
in rendering a decision. So where the teller of a )ank
by deceitful refresentations induced piaintiif to pur-
chase certain tailroaa bnds, the bank, on being sued
for damages resulting from the purchase, ws held not
liable (a). In cases quite similar no doubt thie de-
fense of Ultra Vires would be sustained, and the injured
party left to his right of action a."inst theagent (b).
The decision of the above case turned upon the construc-
tion put upon the woras "Lu: and sell", which were con-
tained in the Act under which the hank was organized.
This illustrates the difficulty of determining the effect
of an act performed under the provisions of a charter
so Seneral in its terms. '"he rsponsibility for the
act turns on a pivot ana may be quite easily shifted
so as to fall either on the agent or the corporation.
A case which seems to be in the border-land between acts
Ultra Vires and those for which the corporation is li-
able is Hutchinson v. Western & AtI. R. R. Co., 6 heisk.
634. There a corporation, chartered to construct and
operate certain railways undertook to run in connection
with the road a steamship line. Two of the boats collicdd
and a passenger was killed. The corpovation excused its
acts on the ground that it had no authority to run
(a) Weckler v. Pirst NTational Bank, 42 i16h. 580.
(b) Loyd v. city of Col-Lmbus, (Ga.) 15 S. E. 818.
the boats. The court said that acts Ultra Vires were
as e-s1ly imputed to uoror-tions as to indiviauals,
"else the maxim, th-t 'no man si~ll take cv-ntae of'
his own wrong' " is vio~iat0Q. !ut this statement is
layLely qualil'ied by t e remark that. tni- liability of
the corporation is insured if it has knov&ledge ol' the
act and reco;7nizes it .-s done to carry on its business.
O)ther cases put the. (ooctrine as strongly as the case
last cited (A); but it is to be noticed that tle, position
taken t)y the corporation generally amounts to a direct
affirmance of the act. The broad statrment of the rule
is made without pointing tne possibility of the act being
of such a nature as to oissolve for the moment the re-
lation between the principal and his aent.
The second requisite for fixing the liability of
the corporation for the tortious acts of its servants
is that teact shall be wi-thin the real or apparent
scope of the agent's employment. Wlen the act ol the
ament is of such a character as to be imputable to the
principal is as difficult to determine as it is to s-
certain when the act is within the corporate powers.
There are few giuiCes and t t question is consequently
(a) Nat. r1ank v. Graham, 100 U. S. 69J; Aiox.nder v.
Relfe, 74 Mo. 495; N. Y. &c. R. R. Qo.v. hring, 41
N. J. L. 137.
one of proof of i tention in the business meaning of
that term. If the act be in furtherance of' tne uity
to be performed or necessarily incident to it the cor-
poration is liable though the act be unauthorized or
in some cases if it be expressly Aiorbidden. Thus where
a gate-keeper, upon !.he attempt of plaintili to pass
through a gate without projiucing a ticket, CaLsed plain-
tiff to be arrested and iMprisoned, defendant, a rail-
road company, ,,,as held li, _e(a).The gate-keeper had
been ordered to prevent the passage of any person
not showing a ticket, and his action was, as he thought,
the proper way of carr-'ing out the instructions. In
the co rse of the opinion the court said : "It matters
not that he (gate-k ;eper) exceeded the powers confeired
upon him by his principal and that he aid an act whicui
the principal xa, not authurized to do so ling as he
acted in the line of his duty, or, being engaged in the
service of the defenac nt, attempted to perform a duty
pertaining, ot which he believed to pertain, t o that
service". So in cases where a corporation empiys
persons to arrest and prosecute any one fo ind obstrucing
its tracks , and the agent arrests an innocent person
(a) Lynch v. IIetropolitan El. R. co., 90 Y. .'Il.
the corporation is liable (a). The ct may be wilful
and committed expressly for the purpose of working out
the agen-t's ill will a ainst tleperson injured and yet
the corporation is liable. In T. H. and Ind. R. h. Co.
v. Jackson, 81 Ind. 19, a railway company was held lia-
ble for the act of a trainman in throwing water upon
plaintiff who was seated in a car. Althoujh no set
rule can be promulgated whereby the acts within the
agent's scope of authority may be eisily distinguished
from those without, it is at least certain that a cor-
poration's liability for the unauthorized acts of its
agents "Is limited to unauthorized modes of doing
authorized acts". Thus w!.iere a street car conductor
threw plaintiff from the car because he refused to aioht
not
while the car was in motion, the companywqs 4ieldAlia-
ble (b). The court admitted the indefiniteness of the
rule but stated that the difficiilty arose not in the
principle but in its application. Of course, in this
case, the act of the conductor was wholly uncalled for;
though the deeision might have been different had the
act been comitted when the passenger was alighting.
(a) Evansville & T. H. R-. Co. v. ;ucKee, 99 Ind. 519;
The Penn. ilo. v. Weddle, 100 lnd. 139.
(b) Isaacs v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 4if N. Y. 122.
And yet the Indiana courts would, it seems, ,iold the
corn pany liable under almst any circ*matarices. In T.
H. and Ind. R. R. Co. v. Jackson (supra) it ws said:'
"The appellant .lad undertaken to carry t-it plaintiff
as a passenger upon its train and. was bound to do it
safely. For this purpose, the appellant was represent-
ed by its -.gents in charge of..the trains, and if they
did any thing inconsistert with the safe carriage and
delivery of the Plaintiff, upon the pl irest princi-
ples of law as well as ood public policy, is liabla
for t-.e injury." The directions to an agent given by
h4s principal are often of much consequence as showing
what the agent was authorized to do [ut they do not have
the effect of shielding the principal fvom liability.
The authority of' tne agent is usuully a matter of' infer-
ence and is to Le discovered from surrounding circum-
stances and the usual course of business. It is ,aid
that the principal will not be presumed to authorize
the cormission of any thing unlawful, but the presump-
tion is of almost no effect. The apparent authority
of an agent may be made up of: 1. Powers cctually con-
ferred by the principal. 2. Powers incidental i. e.,
those necessary to carry into eflect tiie powers con-
ferred. 3. Powe s wnich cre annexed by cu-stom or usage
21
to the express authority actuall; conferred. 4. Powers
which principal h~s by his condu-t led third jersons to
believe he has conferried on his agent. D. Puwers
whiclh princii~al has ien deemed to . ve --atified. in
order triat there may i)e a le.al ratifi,;tiun ti:e grin-
cipal must have knowleaLue of the wrun, (_).
(a) H-erring v. Skaggs, 62 Ala. 180.
CH APT E R II.
The rble that corporations are liable fur torts
in the same manner as ircividuals -re, uncter tiie s5Jie
circumstanctes, is found to be entirely too broad when
the different cla,,ses of corporations ere taken into
consideration. The wiCde6t ciierence exists between
private and municipal corporations ii, respect to their
liability. The first ale fairly within thlu rule above
stated and so need no esecial mention. Municipal
corporations are to be ouistinouished from quasi-public
corporations which are liable for torts only w-en so
declared so by statute. In Shelaon v. Kalamazoo, 24
Mich. 383, the general tule as to tue liability of mu-
micipal corporations is stated thus : "T _e doctrine is
entirely untenable that tI ere can be no municipal lia-
bility for unlawf;1 acts done by municipal authorities
to the prejudice of private parties. In this respect,
public c,.rporations are as distinctly legal persons as
priv-te corporations. There are officers who are cor-
poration atents, and tilere are municipal officers whose
duties are independent of agency and with distinct lia-
bilities. But whn the act done is in law
a corporate act, tliVre is no gi'ound upon rt'son or
authority for hlaing th-t if tiere is any le, al li.t.il-
ity at all arising out of' it, a corporatiun rriy not be
answerable- - - to hold that positive vr ongs must in all
cases be co,sidered as purely individual and nut corpo-
rate acts, would be a novelty i. jurisprudence."
We are concerned only with tnu explanation of tue
sentence above quoted wnich speaks or corpozate agent'.
The officer of a municiial corporation ca& bind the
corporation only when he ha6 authority to act. An
act might be done colore officii,but unless authorized
the a jeut is, so iar as that particular act is concerned,
wholly aivested of thue power incidental to his position
(a). The authority may be expressly conferred or it
may be inferred from the general scope of' the agent's
authority. It is held that for tortious acts done
Lona fide in the course of tne performance of a dty
the corporation is liable. As where an overseer of
hijhways, having gene_.aJ authority to card for public
streets, entered upon the premises uf plaintiff and set
Lack his fence claiming t1 at it encroa ffhed upon the ,rop-
erty of the public (b).
(a) Lee v. village of SanA. hill, 40 rul. Y., 442.
(b) Thayer v. 0ity of Toston, 19 Pick., 511.
Put who are agt;. ts of a ruricipAll corporation Y Only
those p,'sons who are controlle-d by the corporation anid
are employed for its esecial benelit. Persons enlojuuc
considered
idcause/,necessarily incidehit to t inlu existence of a town
or city are not agents in the sense of being able to
render the porporation liable for their acts. Thus
where a person was run over and killed by an ambuiance
belo-2iging to tie city and driven by an employe of the
Coriliissiol of puklic ch/ities, the city wa;3 held not
lia;!e because the agent was Lan officer provided for
by legislative enactment (a). For the sane reason acts
of police officers (b), firemen (c) and persons appoint-
ed to carry into execution sanitary regulations (a) are
not imputable to the corporation. The matter is well
in
expluined NMaximilian v. Mtror (supra). The court said:
"There are two kinds of d tiswhich are imposed upon a
municipal corporation. One is of that ki:d whicl arises
from the grant of a special power, --- ; the other is of
(a) .,axiriilian v. %,:ayor, o2 N. Y. 160.
(b) Buttrick v. City of Lowell, 1. .llen 172; Wisiiart v.
City of Erandon, 4 M-nitoba, 453.
(c)Hafford v. City of Eedford, 16 Gray, 297; Hames v.
City of Oshkosh, 33 Wis.,314; Fisher v. Toston,104.
,,ass. 87, Lawson v. City of S~ttle, (Wan.) 33 P,,347;
Alexander v. City of' Vicksburg,68 Miss.,564; Gillespie
v. City of Lincoln, (Teb.)52 N. W.,811.
(d)Ogg v. City of Lanslng,35 Ia., 495.
that kind which arises, or is implied, from the use of
politioal riohts under the eneral law,
--- In the exercise of' the former power, anu under IO
duty to the public which tl]e ceijtanco and use of thu
power invo1lvos a municiality is like a private cor-
poration, and is lial-le for a failure to use its power
well, or for an injury caused by using it badly. Put
where the power is intrusted to it as one of the politi-
cal divisions of the State, and is conferred nut for the
irmLediate ienl'it of the municipality, but as a means
to be exercised of the sovereign power for the benefit
of all citizens, the corporation is not liable for non-
user, nor for misuser by public agents.'
The other class of corporations differing from
private corporations in the matter of liability are
those founded for cha itable purposes. ly the weight
of authority such institutions are taken entirely with-
out the operation of: the doctrine of Respondeat superior
ant so are not responsible for acts of tiieir agents.
Th rule proceeds upon the SiJound that the .)bject of such
the
corporations is benefit of the public and that withoLt
this protection to charitable corporations t.--e public
would sul'fer the loss of many of tdse institutions;
as few corporations would survive the suits which per-
sons whom they are compelled to employ woKuld cast upon
them. So it is said : "--- TIhe law jealously 6uards
the charitablle trust fund, and does nut permit it to be
frittered away by the negligent acts of those emplued
in its execution". In Fire Ins. Patrol v. Loyd, 120
Pa. St. 624, it was soubht to hold defenddnt liable for
wrongfully causin ; the death of plaintiff's relative.
Deceased a,; killed by a b undle thrown from a window by
agent of defendant. The court said: "The insurance
patrol is a public charity. It has no property or funds
which h._ s not been contributed for the purposes of char-
ity, and it would be against all law anui all equity to
take those trust funds so contributed for a special
charitable purpose to compensate injuries inflicted or
ogcasioned by the negligence of the aent or servant of
the patrol. It wodA.d be carrying the doctrine of
respondeat superior to an unreasonable anC dangerous
length. --- I trust and elieve it will never ie ex-
tended to the sweeping away of public charitites; to the
misapplication of funds especially contributed for a
public charitable purpose and objects not contemplated
by the donors".
No court denies the correctness of ti:e rule. But F'ode
Island seems to hz-ve laid down the opposite doct'ine
in Galvin v. R. I. hospital, 12 R. 1. 411. The case
was one brought to recover Qanmagcs for injuries sus-
tained by a patient throu,,n lhe improper treatment of
hospital attenarits • From the reasons for the holdin,
given in the 6pinion it would seem to appear that the
case went on thegruund that the corporation wrs negli-
gent in the ,election of its servants. If this be the
basis of the decision , the court aiffered but little
from other authorities. For in ' ew York an allegation
of negl Lence on the part of' officers of' a charitable
corporation in the selections of its agents is suffi-
cient to warrant a continuanco of the a. tion (a).
lut whatever may be the reasons for the decision, the
legislature, shortly after the decision, passed 4n act
relieving charitable co~prations of all liability for
the tortious acts of tneir serv.nts (b) and thus luft
the doctrine clear and settled (c).
(a) Hass v. Miss . Society,6 Misc. (N.Y.) 281.
(b) Laws of Rhode Island, 18F0, Chapt. 163, Suc. 1.
(c) ,enton v. Trustees of Boston (,ity hospital,140 Lass.
13; Perry v. hOuse of Refuge,63 Mad. 20; Dows v. _iarper
Hospital, (Mich. ) 60 1T. . 42.

